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2 7 See Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Rev. Rul. 55-
119, 1955-1 C.B. 352.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT. The plaintiffs
owned two tracts of land accessible only through a private
road through the defendant's farm property.  The plaintiffs
purchased the property in 1972 and used the property for
their residence and for rental of another house on the
property.  The defendant claimed to have granted permission
to the plaintiffs and their tenants to use the road and to have
erected and locked a gate on the road in 1982 in order to
prevent acquisition of the road by adverse possession over
ten years.  The court held that the erection of the gate and
the defendant's other testimony demonstrated that the
defendant was aware of the plaintiffs' adverse use of the road.
The trial court did not believe the defendant's testimony that
permission was granted to the plaintiffs to use the road, and
the appellate court did not disagree with the finding.  The
court also held that the construction of a new house did not
change the character of the plaintiffs' use of the road as
access to their residence. The court upheld the trial court
order giving the plaintiffs a prescriptive easement over the
road as access to the residential properties. Gault v .
Bahm, 826 S.W.2d 875 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
ANIMALS
HORSES. The plaintiff sued the defendant for injuries
suffered when the plaintiff's automobile struck the
defendant's horse on a road within 100 feet of the city limits
of Tuscaloosa and within the police jurisdiction of that city.
The plaintiff argued that the city ordinance applied which
prohibited the owners of livestock from allowing the
animals to run at large.  The court held the ordinance
applied in this case because cities have the authority to
extend the jurisdiction of their ordinance outside the city
limits, up to the police jurisdiction allowed by statute.
Wilkins v. Johnson, 595 So.2d 466 (Ala. 1992).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The Chapter 7 debtors sought
to avoid the unsecured portion of a lien against their
homestead.  The court applied Dewsnup v. Timm, 112
S.Ct. 773 (1992), retroactively and held that liens could not
be split into unsecured and secured portions, with the
unsecured portion avoided under Section 506(d).  In re
Jablonski, 139 B.R. 150 (Bankr. W.D. Pa .
1992) .
The Chapter 13 debtor sought to have an IRS lien
declared unsecured as to the amount which exceeded the
value of the debtor's property securing the lien.  The IRS
argued that Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S.Ct. 773 (1992)
prevented bifurcation of the lien.  The court held that the
Dewsnup holding was limited to Chapter 7 cases and
allowed the avoidance of the unsecured portion of the tax
lien. In re  Butler, 139 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E . D .
Okla. 1992).
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS.  The debtor's Chapter
12 case was converted to Chapter 7 because of fraud by the
debtor in the case.  The Chapter 7 trustee sought to use
collateral estoppel in avoiding transfers by the debtor as
fraudulent transfers.  The court held that collateral estoppel
would not be applied because the previous finding of fraud
was more broad and did not specifically pertain to the
transfers sought to be avoided in the Chapter 7 case. In re
Graven, 138 B.R. 587 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1992).
DISCHARGE.  The creditors had obtained a state
court judgment against the debtor for the debtor's wrongful
taking of money from a joint bank account of a decedent of
whom the creditors were heirs.  The creditors argued that the
judgment amount was nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(4) for defalcation while the debtor was in a fiduciary
capacity.  The court held that Section 523(a)(4) did not
apply because the debtor was found, in the state action, to
have taken the money before the debtor was appointed estate
representative. In re  Brawn, 138 B.R. 327 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1992).
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The debtor was a defendant in a suit seeking damages for
the debtor's wrongful trespass and removal of trees from
Indian lands.  The plaintiff in that suit, the United States,
sought double damages as allowed by Wis. Stat. § 26.09.
The debtor sought a ruling that the double damages were
dischargeable under Section 523(a)(7) as compensatory
damages.  The court held that the double damages would be
dischargeable because the damages were awardable regardless
of the trespasser's intent. In re Marvin, 139 B.R. 2 0 2
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS.
AVOIDABLE LIENS.  The Chapter 7 debtor sought to
avoid a junior judgment lien which impaired the debtor's
homestead exemption.  The court held that the lien would
be avoided only to the extent the lien impaired the
exemption, thus subordinating the judgment lien to the
debtor's exemption amount in the case of a post-bankruptcy
sale or exchange of the homestead. In re  Prestegaard,
139 B.R. 117 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1992).
The debtors had purchased household furniture by two
installment contracts which were secured by purchase
money security interests.  The two contracts were later
combined into one with additional purchase of credit and life
insurance and a small distribution to the debtor.  The debtor
sought to avoid the lien as impairing the debtor's exemption
in the furniture. The court held that, under Texas law, the
combination of the two contracts did not destroy the
purchase money aspect of the security interest and that the
purchase money portion of the contract was not avoidable.
In re  Crispin, 139 B.R. 187 (Bankr. E.D. Tex .
1992) .
After senior secured liens were subtracted, $122,000
remained in the value of the debtor's homestead for which
the debtors claimed a $45,000 exemption.  The homestead
was also subject, in order of priority, to a judicial lien for
$144,000, a consensual lien for $75,000 and various other
liens.  The homestead exemption was found to be senior to
the judicial liens but junior to the consensual lien.  The
court held that the remainder of the homestead proceeds was
to be allocated as follows: (1) the judicial lien of $144,000
was reduced to $122,000, (2) the judicial lien was further
reduced by the exemption amount to $77,000, (3) the first
consensual lien was reduced to the remaining amount,
$45,000, (4) the debtors received nothing for the homestead
exemption, and (5) the remaining portion of the above liens
and all other liens were unsecured and avoided. In re
Paterson, 139 B.R. 229 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1992).
BANK ACCOUNT.  The debtor claimed the entire
amount in a credit union account as exempt under Calif.
Fin. Code. § 14864.  The court held that the credit union
account was exempt only to the extent the funds were also
exempt under Calif. Code of Civil Proc. §§ 703.010-
704.995. In re  Petruzzelli, 139 B.R. 241 (Bankr.
E.D. Cal. 1992).
HOMESTEAD.  The debtor claimed, under 14 Me. Rev.
Stat. § 4422(1), a $60,000 exemption for a homestead as a
physically disabled person.  The creditors argued that the
debtor was entitled to only the $7,500 exemption because
the creditors claimed a judgment lien from an action
involving other than ordinary negligence.  The court held
that the "opt-out" statute, 14 Me. Rev. Stat. § 4426, voided
the exception to the greater exemption in federal bankruptcy
cases. In re Brawn, 138 B.R. 327 (Bankr. D. M e .
1992) .
Although the debtors listed a residence as an exempt
homestead and received a discharge in their Chapter 7 case,
the debtors did not seek avoidance of judgment liens as
impairing the homestead until over a year after the closing
of the case and when the debtors sought to sell the
residence.  The debtors moved to reopen the case to allow
them to avoid the judgment lien against their residence.
The lien holder objected, arguing that the residence was not
eligible for the exemption because the debtors also rented an
apartment in another city where one of the debtors worked.
The court held that the residence qualified for the exemption
in that the apartment was only used as a temporary
residence.  In addition, the court allowed the reopening of
the case and the avoidance of the lien, with payment of
$1,000 by the debtors to compensate the lien holder for the
expense of the reopening of the case. In re  Dodge, 1 3 8
B.R. 602 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992).
LIFE INSURANCE.  The debtor was allowed to
exempt, under Vt. Stat. § 2740(18), the entire value of the
debtors' unmatured life insurance policies. In re
Gabelhart, 138 B.R. 425 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1992).
PROVISIONS.  The farm debtor claimed $4,200 worth
of crops as six months' provisions as exempt under Neb.
Rev. Stat. § 25-1556(2).  The court held that crops were not
provisions eligible for the exemption because the crops
would not be directly eaten by the debtor and family, but
would need to be sold with the proceeds used to purchase
food. First Nat'l Bank of Wahoo v. Plihal, 1 3 6
B.R. 810 (D. Neb. 1989).
  FEDERAL TAXATION  
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE.  While the
debtor corporation was doing business under a Chapter 11
plan, the corporation failed to pay all employment
withholding taxes and the case was converted to Chapter 7.
Two corporate officers were given notice by the IRS of their
liability for the unpaid withholding taxes.  The corporation
argued that the unpaid taxes and interest accrued during the
Chapter 11 case were not allowed administrative expense
priority in the Chapter 7 case.  The court held that the taxes
were entitled to administrative expense priority and the
interest was also allowed priority to the extent payable from
estate funds.  To the extent the officers remained liable for
the taxes, interest continued to accrue post-petition as to
their liability.  In addition, the court held that the IRS was
not required to allocate estate payments of taxes first to the
withholding taxes.  Matter of Peter Del Grande
Corp., 138 B.R. 458 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1992).
CLAIMS. The IRS filed timely claims for the debtor's
1984 and 1985 taxes and the debtor's Chapter 13 plan was
confirmed.  After the confirmation and over one year after
the claims bar date, the IRS filed claims for 1980 and 1981
taxes. The court held that the additional claims were not
allowed because the claims were new claims, involving
taxable years different from the timely filed claims. In re
Rains, 139 B.R. 158 (Bankr. D. Md. 1992).
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DISCHARGE.  In 1978, the IRS assessed the debtor
for taxes, interest and a fraud penalty.  The debtor filed for
Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 1988 and received a discharge.  The
court held that the discharge included the penalty portion of
the assessment because the penalty related to taxes assessed
more than three years before the bankruptcy filing. In re
Byrum, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 5 0 , 2 5 7
(C.D. Calif. 1992).
The debtors claimed to have timely filed their 1984 tax
return along with a check by regular mail.  The IRS had
received the check but had no record of the return.  The IRS
did not send notice of the lack of a return because the
debtors were under a criminal tax investigation.  The debtors
sent the IRS a copy of the 1984 return in 1990 after the
criminal investigation was concluded and the IRS requested
the return.  The court ruled that the 1984 tax claim was not
dischargeable under Section 523(a)(1) because only the
evidence of the IRS receipt of the return in 1990 was
sufficient proof of filing.  The court, however, disallowed
the IRS claim for penalties and interest because the IRS
failed to give the debtors timely notice that the tax return
was not received. In re Clark, 138 B.R. 579 (Bankr.
E.D. Ark. 1991).
PLAN .  The IRS filed claims for income, FICA, and
FUTA taxes, a large portion of which were secured by tax
liens.  The IRS filed a motion for dismissal of the debtors'
Chapter 11 case because insufficient time remained under
the six year payment limitation of Section 1129(a)(9)(C) for
payment of the tax claims.  The court held that the six year
limitation applied only as to priority taxes, which included
income, FICA and FUTA taxes, except to the extent the
taxes were secured by a lien.  Factual issues remained as to
whether the debtors could pay the unsecured portion of the
tax claims within the six year limit. In re  Reichert,
138 B.R. 522 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1992).
SETOFF . Within 90 days prior to the debtors' filing
for bankruptcy, the IRS offset their income tax refund for
the prior taxable year against the debtors' student loan debts
held by the Department of Education.  The Bankruptcy
Court held that the debtors could recover the setoff amounts
because the date of the setoff was the date the refund was
authorized by the IRS and not the last day of the prior
taxable year. The District Court reversed and held that the
action for recovery of the setoff refund was barred by the
lack of a waiver of governmental immunity where the
Department of Education had not filed a claim in the case.
In re Hankerson, 138 B.R. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1992) ,
rev'g , 133 B.R. 711 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1991).
CONTRACTS
BREACH. The plaintiff operated a grain and flour mill
in Missouri and sold wheat flour under two three-month
contracts to the defendant pasta manufacturer located in
Texas.  The defendant failed to take delivery of about half of
the first contract amount and took delivery of none of the
second contract amount. The plaintiff sued for breach of
contact in Missouri for the difference in fair market value of
the flour under the contract price.  The court held that
personal jurisdiction over the Texas defendant in Missouri
was proper because the last action binding the parties in
contract occurred by the plaintiff's acceptance of the contract
in Missouri.  The court rejected the defendant's argument
that the second contract was an extension of the first with
only an increase in the amount of flour to be delivered.  The
court held that the contracts were separate contracts with
separate delivery amounts, purchase price and expiration
dates.  The plaintiff was awarded the difference between the
fair market value of the flour as of the last day of each
contract and the contract price multiplied by the amount of
flour not purchased by the defendant. U.S. Durum
Milling, Inc. v. Frescala Foods, Inc., 7 8 5
F.Supp. 1369 (E.D. Mo. 1992).
CORPORATIONS
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY. The defendant was the
parent corporation of a subsidiary which had merged with
another subsidiary which had purchased the manufacturer of
a grain loading auger.  The plaintiff had been injured in an
accident involving the auger and asserted that the defendant
had assumed the manufacturer's liability for the auger.  The
defendant provided evidence that the purchasing subsidiary
had agreed to assume liability for products made by the
manufacturer, but no evidence was presented that the
merging subsidiary or the defendant parent corporation
agreed to assume such liability.  The court held that the
defendant corporation did not assume such liability either
expressly or through being the parent corporation of the
merged subsidiary.  Schnoor v. Deitchler, 4 8 2




VETERINARIANS.  The APHIS has issued
proposed regulations amending the accreditation
requirements for veterinarians on behalf of APHIS.  The
changes would establish accreditation on a national basis,
require an orientation program for accredited veterinarians,
and establish standards of performance for accredited
veterinarians. 57 Fed. Reg. 23540 (June 4, 1992).
WETLANDS.  The ASCS has adopted as final
regulations implementing the Wetlands Reserve Program
under which the USDA purchases easements from owners of
eligible land who voluntarily agree to restore and protect
farmed wetlands or converted wetlands. The WRP is
available in 1992 only in California, Iowa, Louisiana,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, New York, North




CHARITABLE DEDUCTION.  The decedent
established a testamentary trust, funded with $1,350x,
which provided an annual annuity to the decedent's sibling
of $12x.  At the death of the beneficiary, the remainder
passed to charitable organizations.  The trust was reformed
after the decedent's death to provide for $225x to be held in
trust for the sibling with a set monthly annuity amount
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with the remainder passing to the charitable organizations.
The rest of the original trust corpus was distributed directly
to the charitable organizations. The IRS ruled that the trust,
as amended, qualified as a charitable remainder trust and the
decedent's estate could take a charitable deduction for the
value of the charitable remainder and the direct distribution
to the charitable organizations.  Ltr. Rul. 9221014 ,
Feb. 18, 1992.
DISCLAIMERS. At the decedent's death, the
decedent's one-half share of a corporation passed to two
trusts for the surviving spouse, with remainders to a
charitable trust.  Within nine months of the decedent's
death, the surviving spouse made a written disclaimer of the
interests in the trusts. The charitable trust, represented by
the State Attorney General, disclaimed the remainder
interests through a court order.  The IRS ruled that the
disclaimers were effective.  Because of the disclaimers, the
stock passed to the decedent's children.  The IRS ruled that
the basis of the stock to the children was the fair market
value as of the decedent's date of death. Ltr. R u l .
9222041, Feb. 28, 1992.
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFER TAX.
The grantor establish an irrevocable trust in 1959 which
was not amended after September 25, 1985.  The trust paid
monthly annuities to several beneficiaries and one of the
beneficiaries renounced the interest in the trust in favor of a
commercial annuity purchased by the second tier trust
beneficiaries.  The IRS noted that the renunciation was not
a qualified disclaimer because the annuitant had been
receiving benefits since 1959.  The IRS ruled that the
renunciation of the beneficiary's interest did not cause the
trust to be subject to GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9221005, Feb.
13, 1992.
The decedent established two trusts by will in May 1983
and the decedent died on December 5, 1986.  The surviving
spouse had a nongeneral power of appointment over the
corpus of both trusts which was exercised by will in 1987.
The appointment did not postpone or suspend the vesting,
absolute ownership or power of alienation of an interest in
the trust for a period of more than 21 years after a life in
being at the decedent's death. The IRS ruled that the exercise
of the power of appointment did not subject the trusts to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9221037, Feb. 21, 1992.
Trusts for the grantors' children were established in 1976
with no amendments since September 25, 1985.  The trusts
had one corporate trustee.  The trusts were amended to
provide for a trustee committee, compensation for the
committee members, court ordered full accounting by a
trustee, and fees for administration.  The IRS ruled that the
amendments would not cause the trusts to be subject to
GSTT. Ltr. Rul. 9222042, Feb. 28, 1992.
GROSS ESTATE. The taxpayer retired in 1979 and
elected to receive annual payments from an employer's
retirement fund. The taxpayer did not change the method of
payment but changed the remainder beneficiary several
times. The IRS ruled that under the transitional rules of
TRA 1986, Sec. 525(b), because the taxpayer did not
change the method of benefit payment before death, the
value of the remainder interest would not be included in the
taxpayer's gross estate. Ltr. Rul. 9221030, Feb. 2 1 ,
1992 .
  INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX.
The decedent was a partner in a partnership composed of the
decedent, the decedent's three children and trusts for the
children's children.  The decedent's estate elected to pay
federal estate tax by installments. After the decedent's share
of the partnership was divided among the other partners, one
child and the trusts for that child's children received
distributions of business assets in exchange for their
partnership interests.  The remaining children and the trusts
for their children then terminated the partnership and formed
two separate S corporations to carry on the business of the
partnership as two businesses.  The IRS ruled that the
termination of the partnership and formation of two S
corporations did not cause acceleration of payment of estate
tax. Ltr. Rul. 9222040, Feb. 28, 1992.
SPECIAL USE VALUATION. The decedent's
federal estate tax return made the special use valuation
election but did not contain the notice of election and the
agreement of the heirs to the election.  The IRS denied a
request for extension of time to file the special use
valuation election in order to provide the missing
documents. Ltr. Rul. 9221022, Feb. 20, 1992.
VALUATION. The taxpayer/shareholder entered into a
stock option agreement with the corporation under which
employees could purchase voting stock of the corporation at
a set price.  The taxpayer granted options to nephews.  The
IRS ruled that the nephews were family members for
purposes of Section 2703 valuation rules. Ltr. R u l .
9222043, Feb. 28, 1992.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
DEPRECIATION.  The IRS has issued tables,
revised for inflation, detailing the limitation on depreciation
deductions for automobiles first placed in service during
1992:
Tax Year Amount
1st tax year $2,700
2d tax year 4,400
3d tax year 2,650
Each succeeding year 1,575
The IRS also issued tables providing the amounts to be
included in income for automobiles first leased during 1992.
Rev. Proc. 92-43, I.R.B. 1992-23, 23.
COURT AWARDS AND JUDGMENTS. The
taxpayers had obtained a settlement of their Title VII sex
discrimination case which provided for payment of back
pay.  The taxpayers sought refund of withheld income taxes
arguing that the settlement payments were excludible, under
Section 104(a)(2), as damages received on account of
personal injuries.  The lower appellate court had agreed but
the U.S. Supreme Court reversed.  The court reasoned that a
Title VII action did not involve a personal injury tort action
because Congress had limited the award in such cases to
back pay and injunctive relief and had not included the usual
types of damages available in personal injury tort cases,
110                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       Agricultural Law Digest
such as punitive damages and damages for pain and
suffering. U.S. v. Burke, 112 S.Ct. 1867 (1992).
INSTALLMENT METHOD. The taxpayer sold
some property by installment sale and intended to report
gain on the installment method but the tax return preparer
mistakenly reported all of the gain in the first taxable year.
The request to revoke the election out was made as soon as
the mistake was discovered.  The IRS allowed revocation of
the election out of the installment method. Ltr. R u l .
9221038, Feb. 21, 1992.
LEVY.  The taxpayer's spouse, prior to their marriage,
had federal income tax liabilities.  In an attempt to shield
the taxpayer's assets from a levy for the spouse's taxes, the
parties executed an antenuptual agreement to keep their
property separate.  The taxpayer argued that the antenuptial
agreement prevented the IRS from levying against the
taxpayer's wages as separate property.  The court held that,
under Nevada law, antenuptial agreements were effective
only as between the spouses and were not effective against
the IRS. Jansen v. U.S., 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas .
(CCH) ¶ 50,260 (D. Nev. 1992).
PARTNERSHIPS
DEFINITION.  The IRS has determined that the
California Revised Limited Partnership Act as amended in
1991 corresponds to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act
for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2. Rev. Rul. 92-
41, I.R.B. 1992-23, 22.  The IRS has determined that
the Delaware Revised Limited Partnership Act as amended
in 1990 corresponds to the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act for purposes of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2. Rev. R u l .
92-42, I.R.B. 1992-23, 22.
S CORPORATIONS
LIQUIDATION.  All stock of an S corporation which
operated a commercial building was owned by the decedent
who bequeathed all of the estate to a single beneficiary.  The
beneficiary decided not to continue the corporation and the
building was sold and the corporation liquidated under a plan
of liquidation with cash distribution to the beneficiary
within 12 months.  The IRS ruled that no gain or loss was
recognized on the distribution of the cash in complete
liquidation of the corporation.  The beneficiary would
recognize gain or loss based on the difference between the
beneficiary's stock basis and the amount received from the
distribution. Ltr. Rul. 9218019, Jan. 23, 1992.
STOCK BASIS.  The IRS has issued proposed
regulations relating to adjustments to the basis of a
shareholder's stock in an S corporation and the basis of a
shareholder's indebtedness of an S corporation to a
shareholder.  The IRS also issued proposed regulations
relating to the treatment of distributions to S corporation
shareholders. 57 Fed. Reg. 24436 (June 9, 1992).
The basis of a shareholder's stock is increased, on a per
share-per day basis, by the shareholder's pro rata share of (1)
the corporation's separately stated items of income, (2) the
corporations nonseparately stated items of income, and (3)
the excess of the corporation's deductions for depletion over
the basis of the property subject to depletion. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1367-1(b).
The basis of a shareholder's stock is decreased, on a per
share-per day basis, (but not below zero) by (1) distributions
that are not includible in the shareholder's income under
Section 1368, (2) the shareholder's pro rata share of
corporation items of loss and any expense of the corporation
that is not deductible in computing its taxable income and
not chargeable to a capital account, and (3) deductions for
depletion to the extent that the deduction does not exceed the
basis of the property subject to depletion. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1367-1(c).
The proposed regulations require that, if for any taxable
year the shareholder's basis of an S corporation debt has
been decreased, any net increase in shareholder basis for any
subsequent taxable year must be used to restore the basis of
the debt, as existing on the first day of the subsequent
taxable year, before increasing the shareholder's basis in
stock.  If the shareholder holds more than one debt of the
corporation, the restoration of basis is to be first applied to
any debt which is repaid during the subsequent taxable year.
The remaining increase is to be allocated among the
remaining debts according to the amount of reduction in the
previous taxable year. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1 .1367-
2(c).
The proposed regulations provide that a distribution by
an S corporation without earnings and profits is not
included in the shareholder's gross income to the extent the
distribution does not exceed the adjusted basis of all the
shareholder's shares of stock. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1368-1(c). If the amount of the distribution exceeds the
adjusted basis of all of the shareholder's stock, the excess is
treated as gain from the sale or exchange of property.
A distribution in excess of a corporation's accumulated
adjustments account (AAA) is not included in the gross
income of the shareholder to the extent the distribution is an
actual distribution of money and the portion in excess of the
AAA does not exceed the shareholder's net share of the
corporation's previously taxed income immediately before
the distribution. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(d).
The tax effect of a distribution to a shareholder is
determined only after taking into account the adjustments to
bases of the shareholder's stock under Section 1367 without
regard for the distributions made during the corporation's
taxable year.  The determination of the source of a
distribution is to be made only after the AAA has been
adjusted to reflect (1) increases for taxable income items and
the excess of the deductions for depletion, (2) decreases for
nondeductible noncapital expenses (excluding taxes
attributable to taxable years as a C corporation or to exempt
income), (3) decreases from oil and gas depletion deductions,
and (4) decreases for items of loss or deduction. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1368-1(e).
If a shareholder disposes of 20 percent or more of the
shareholder's stock in a 30-day period, the corporation may
elect to treat the taxable year as two taxable years, with the
first ending on the date the stock was transferred,  for
purposes of allocating items of income and loss,
adjustments to the AAA, basis and earnings and profits, and
determining the tax effect of distributions. Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 1.1368-1(g).
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If the sum of all distributions, except distributions from
earnings and profits or PTI, during the taxable year exceed
the AAA at the close of the taxable year, the balance of the
AAA is allocated among the distributions in proportion to
the amount of each distribution. Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.1368-2(b) .
TRUSTS.  Upon the death of the grantor a trust for the
grantor's two children became irrevocable and was split into
two separate shares, one for each beneficiary, with
remainders to the issue of the beneficiary. The second share
was to be treated as a separate trust with no possibility that
corpus could be transferred to the other share. The
beneficiary of the second trust transferred trust property to
an S corporation.  The IRS ruled that the second trust was a
qualified Subchapter S trust and that only the current
beneficiary needed to make the trust election. Ltr. R u l .
9221036, Feb. 21, 1992.
SOCIAL SECURITY TAX . The taxpayer was a
professional corporation with a husband and wife as sole
shareholders and employees.  The employees had two-year
employment contracts with the corporation under which
compensation was to be paid bi-annually.  The court held
that the compensation was considered paid on the last day of
the two-year contracts.  Thus, the husband's compensation
in 1987 was to be considered paid in May 1986 at the end of
the 1984-1986 contract and the 1989 wages were considered
paid in May 1988 at the end of the 1987-1988 contract.
The wages then became subject to FICA tax. Hoerl &
Assoc., P.C. v. U.S., 785 F.Supp. 1430 ( D .
Colo. 1992).
MORTGAGES
PEANUT QUOTA. The plaintiff had owned a farm
which had a peanut quota allotment.  The farm was
transferred to the defendant through an agreement allowing
foreclosure, with the plaintiffs leasing the land for one year.
The plaintiff asserted that the plaintiff had orally reserved
the peanut quota allotment from the transfer of the land.
The court held that the peanut quota allotment ran with the
land and was transferred with the land in the foreclosure
absent proof of the plaintiff's reservation of the allotment.
Lindsey v. F.D.I.C., 960 F.2d 567 (5th Cir .
1992) .
GUARANTY.  The plaintiff sold a ranch to two
individuals and two corporations owned by the individuals.
The purchase was structured such that the two individuals
would personally own a portion of the ranch, with the
promissory notes given by the individuals guaranteed by
one of the corporations.  After the buyers defaulted on the
sale, the seller sued the corporation on the guaranty.  The
corporation argued that a deficiency judgment was not
allowed, under Calif. Code of Civil Proc. § 580b, on
purchase-money obligations.  The court held that the
corporation was not entitled to protection under Section
580b because the guaranty did not provide any purchase
money for the ranch but was only additional security for the
purchase. Paradise Land & Cattle v. McWilliams
Enter., 959 F.2d 1463 (9th Cir. 1992).
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
AUGER. The plaintiff was injured by falling into an
unprotected auger while loading beans on to a truck. The
plaintiff sued the land and auger owner in negligence in
failing to have a guard on the loading end of the auger and
failing to warn about the defect. The court held that the
auger/land owner had no duty to warn of an open and
obvious danger to the plaintiff who was an experienced
farmer and business invitee.  Schnoor v. Deitchler,
482 N.W.2d 913 (Iowa 1992).
STATE TAXATION
AGRICULTURAL LAND.  The plaintiff purchased
farm land from a finance company which had received the
land by foreclosure.  The land had been assessed for taxation
at $139,000 but the purchase price was for $85,000. The
plaintiff sought reduction in the assessment to the purchase
price, arguing that because the sale was at arm's length, the
assessment board was required to use the purchase price as
the assessed value.  The court held that the plaintiff had
demonstrated that the sale was at arm's length and that the
assessed value had to conform with the purchase price.
Steenberg v. Town of Oakfield, 482 N.W.2d 326
(Wis. 1992).
The plaintiff purchased farm land on which a hog
confinement operation was situated. The purchase was made
using a bill of sale for the livestock and equipment and a
warranty deed for the land.  The livestock and equipment
were sold for $150,000 and the land for $75,000.  The land,
however, was assessed at $190,000 for property tax
purposes.  The court held that the plaintiff had produced
sufficient evidence of the value of the livestock to show that
the purchase price of the land was no more than $87,000
and held that the assessed value of the land would therefore
be $87,000. Dowd v. Board of Assessment, 4 8 2
N.W.2d 583 (Neb. 1992).
TRESPASS
SMOKE. The plaintiff sued the defendant neighbor for
intentional trespass from smoke from the defendant's
burning of fields. The defendant argued that the trespass was
so minimal as to not amount to trespass as a matter of law.
The court held that the intrusion was not minimal and that a
directed verdict for the defendant was reversed for trial only
on the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff.  The
court also held that the defendant's permit from the
Department of Environmental Quality and that burning in
compliance with DEQ regulations was not a defense. Ream





TIMBER. The plaintiff had purchased unoccupied
timber land from one of the defendants.  The seller also
owned substantial timber land around the sold land and hired
an independent contractor to cut and haul timber from those
areas.  In the process of the timber operations, the
independent contractor mistakenly cut a swath of trees on
the plaintiff's land in the construction of a temporary
logging road.  The court reversed a jury award for treble
damages in that the evidence showed that the timber cutting
on the plaintiff's land was a mistake and not willfully or
knowingly done. Bonk v. McPherson, 605 A.2d 7 4
(Me. 1992).
The plaintiff sued a neighbor for the loss of six maple
trees in a woods adjoining the neighbor's property.  The
trees were inadvertently cut over five years.  The plaintiff
sought damages equal to the trees' replacement cost.  The
court held that the damages would be limited to the
difference in value of the land before and after the trees were
cut because the trees were of little esthetic value to the
plaintiff. Because no evidence of reduction in value was
presented, the trial court's award of $350 was appropriate.
Schuyler v. Miller, 590 N.E.2d 1358 (Ohio C t .
App. 1990).
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The following articles are in Vol. 2, No. 1 of the San
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Korbol, "Current Issues Involving Statutory Trusts
Under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act."
Cummings, "The Demise of the Integrity of Oral
Contracts and Promises in Lender-Borrower Relationships
Under California Law."
Gmur, "Regulation of Underground Storage Tanks: A
Farmer and His Money are Soon Parted."
Greaver, "Corporate Farming Restrictions in California:
False Hope for the Family Farm."
Stuart, "The 1990 California Freeze: Disaster Relief
Leaves Farmworkers in the Cold."
CITATION UPDATES
Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 112 S.Ct. 1 6 4 4
(1992) (objection to exemptions), see p. 83 supra.
Bramblett v. Comm'r, 960 F.2d 526 (5th Cir.
1992), rev'g , T.C. Memo. 1990-296  (capital












  Avoidable liens 107
  Bank account 107
  Homestead 107
  Life insurance 107














Federal Estate and Gift Tax
Charitable deduction 109
Disclaimer 109
Generation skipping transfers 109
Gross estate 109
Installment payment of estate tax 109
Special use valuation 109
Valuation 109
Federal Income Taxation










Social security tax 111
Mortgages
Peanut quota 111
Guaranty 111
Products Liability
Auger 111
State Taxation
Agricultural land 111
Trespass
Smoke 111
Timber 112
